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Abstract
We consider costly administration at the center of a farming community surrounding a
forti￿ed village. Land rent taxation is high cost mode of ￿nancing central administration in a
tax incidence sense. Participatory administration by the governed is a lower cost alternative.
We speculate why the low cost option has been out-competed by its higher cost alternative
throughout history. We also take up constraints on predation on farmers by a landlord at the
center. (lo_costdict_oct06.tex)
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1 Introduction
With the aid of a basic land-use model of farmers working plots around a forti￿ed town
we investigate ￿nancing administration at ￿the center￿, costing $A; with land-rent taxation.
We contrast the funding of an administrator by land rent taxation with the "funding" of
administration by rotating participation by all farmers in the community. These two distinct
approaches (democratic versus "professional") have distinct tax incidence analyses which
we take up and observe that participatory administration corresponds to least welfare loss
from "funding". How do we then account over history of the prevalence of administration
by a professional or lord? Our answer is that transactions costs make the operation of the
participatory system the more costly and once a professional administrator is in of￿ce, she
￿nds many ways of entrenching herself for the long term. Our inquiry has itself evolved from
early work on an optimal or Henry George economy, comprising many farmers working
plots around a forti￿ed village, forti￿cations being a public good. Since a convention in
this approach to model-building has each farmer’s land rent remitted to the center and then
re-cycled back as an equal "dividend" per farmer, we were motivated to inquire about how
the center was in fact being manned. Hence our analysis moved to the question of the dead
weight loss from the extraction of funding in a Henry George economy for administration
1 I am indebted to Thor Keoppl, Frank Lewis and Dan Usher for helpful discussions
and to Canada’s SSHRC for ￿nancial support.
1at the center. The two distinct forms of administration which captured our attention, one
"professional" and one participatory, turned out to have distinct incidence aspects when the
funding question is confronted.
The tax-incidence costs of ￿nancing administration were a central topic in the
well-known Olson-McGuire [1976] analysis of predatory government and our analysis
can be viewed as being in the tradition of their pioneering work.2 The central idea in
Olson-McGuire is that a predatory "administrator" will ￿nd it in her interest to set her tax
or take rate at less than 100% in order to maximize her absolute "take". Such restraint in
tax-rate setting, they refer to as the bene￿cent effect of the invisible hand of governing.
Our approach is to take the funding level as given ab initio and to compare two ways of
carrying out administration. In contrast with their work, we have a complete and detailed
base model with explicit land rent and an explicit public good. Our incidence issue revolves
around the clearly de￿ned requirement for a wage or support more generally of $A for the
administrator. We appear to be proceeding along a novel path in this literature by equating
democracy with the administration of a community on a universal participatory basis. This
is clearly a textbook form of democracy rather than one observed over history.
Financing a "professional" administrator with some land rent, we argue leads very
naturally to entrenchment by the administrator at the center and to hereditary landlordism as
the prevalent mode of govenment in many places over many centuries.3 This leads us to
the familiar argument that democracy, here voting for a new administrator, is a device to
forestall entrenchment by the administrator at the center. And we argue that the introduction
of democracy is not easy and is not a natural low cost alternative to the hiring of a permanent
administrator at the center, an administrator supported by a tax on land rent. The traditional
view would be that out of some local violence a strongman emerges who entrenches himself
as the local lord. This local lord proceeds to ￿tax￿ his local farmers to gain a high income and
to maintain his incumbancy as the local lord. Our view does not contradict this scenario but
we add the observation that ￿administration￿ at the center ￿nanced via land rent ￿taxation￿
is not initially the low incidence cost mode of local government, given the ￿xed bill of $A
2 The other large issue concerning democracy is having the laws enacted by elected
legislators re￿ect the preferences of those who participated in the election of the legislators. Our view of democracy
isinasensepriortothisother. Weseedemocracyasamechanismforhavingthevoterscontrolthegovernmentintwo
senses: have ￿the government￿ (the administration) stick to an agenda of activities which the governed agree upon
and secondly have the administratiion or government act in a cost-effective manner. On the latter point, the governed
￿nd it important that the administration not feather its nest with funds which should be in the hands of the governed.
3 The manorial system is the term used often by historians to capture the arrangement of
a landlord providing protection to his velleins (peasant farmers) in return for some form of payment, generally labor
services. Signi￿cant in this system was almost no trade in commodities between communities. The post manorial
systemwascharacterizedbytradeincommoditiesbetweencommunities, relativelyfreemovementoflaborandfairly
well understood rights of ownership in land. See for example North and Thomas [1971] and Allen [1992]. We are
dealing with a fairly stylized manorial system. We do not have inter-community trade but our economy is making use
ofapricesystemandourfarmersareindependentdecision-makers. Earlyonourfarmersareownersoftheirplotsand
can be viewed as hiring an administrator for ￿the center￿.
2needed for current administration. The trend over history against local administration by
co-operative participation must be accounted for by something more than relative simple
dead weight loss measure comparisons. Hence we turn to a consideration of the transactions
costs of operating a participatory scheme as well as a consideration of the advantages of
having a longer-term "professional" as administrator.
We also take up an intermediate case, a permanent and predatory landlord who ￿nds it in
his interest to tax or take at a rate less than 100% of his rightful rent in order to maximize
the value of his taking. In our case, farmers have the option of migrating to the next
community when their per capita welfare falls below that achievable down the road. This is
the constraint which makes our landlord temper her rate of ￿taxation￿.
Our model is a rent-tax variant of one familiar to land-use theorists, the ￿xed coef￿cient
Henry George model.4 In this model, each citizen is a farmer consuming some portion c of
the private good and a public good, G (here defense services). n farmers live in a forti￿ed
village surrounded by small farms of equal size. Each farmer commutes out to her farm
each day, labors, and returns to the village at night. Maximin is the social objective and this
allows us to de￿ne the ￿optimal size￿ of the community. The optimal community framework
turns out to be a convenient setting for analyzing the tax incidence issue. For our later
variant, with land owned by a predatory lord at the center, community size gets de￿ned by
the lord maximizing her tax-take from land rent subject to each tenant-farmer facing the
option of migrating to the next community.
2 The Model
We ￿rst set out a spatial, optimal size economy ("optimal population", maximin, "Henry
George") with a given tax on land rent. We calculate the corresponding optimal economy
for this tax rate, revenues funding the administrator at "the center", and then obtain the
tax rate for $A raised to support the administrator. (Later we will redo these steps for a
"tax" supporting universal participation by citizens in the administrative task.) The economy
has a spaceless "town" in the center, surrounded by a wall for protection, which is in turn
surrounded by farms of unit size for each citizen. Each farmer "commutes" out to his farm
and back each day.
Each farming family is jointly consuming the protection afforded by the village walls. G
is a public good (defense), produced centrally, and ￿nanced by a levy, ￿ on each household.
With n household-farmers, we have n￿ = G in units of the numeraire, say wheat grown on
each farmer’s ONE hectare plot around the town. This tax and expenditure is different from
4 Our model with ￿xed ￿lot￿ sizes and linear transportation costs is an easily recognized variant of the
one in Arnott and Stiglitz [1979]. More recent users of the simple model include
Helsley and Strange [1990] and Black and Henderson [1999]. In the appendix, we
investigate the case of endogenous farm sizes. The resulting model is dif￿cult to work with computationally.
3that below for funding administration at "the center". Let A be each farmer’s production per
period on his one hectare plot,5 and r(x) be a rent payment for use of the hectare and tx be
roundtrip commuting cost per period for accessing the farm from the town. In addition, we
assume that each household shares equally in the net total land rent (1 ￿ Y )RT as part of
the gross household income. Y de￿nes the fraction of total land rent that goes to a distinct
￿outside￿ agent.6 RT is total land rent from the farms around the town and we treat the
town as a point in the center of a circular disc.7 In addition, each farmer has a house in
the center but we gloss over the maintenance costs of this dwelling. (We can appeal to the
￿convention￿ that each farmer lives in a tent in the center, each tent occupying no space!)
A household’s utility is then U(c;G) for c = A ￿ r(x) ￿ tx + ([1 ￿ Y ]RT=n) ￿ ￿:





n;G) as the household utility. A farmer treats RT;G and Y
as parameters.
(a) For c the same over each farmer, we require that land rent satisfy
d[r(x)+tx]
dx = 0 or
r(x) = r+tx￿tx: r is land rent at the edge, x: Given this land rent function, the household





















3￿tx3 is referred to as ￿differential land rent￿, leaving r￿x2 as base land rent. Since each
farmer farms a unit of land, the number of farmers is n(x) = ￿x2:
For G; Y; and edge x given for the moment, we have the economy account in
nc = nA ￿ nr(x) ￿ ntx + [(1 ￿ Y )RT ￿ G]:
Hence
nc = nA ￿ nr(x) ￿ ntx + [(1 ￿ Y )RT ￿ G]
= nA ￿ ￿tx3 +
1
3




= nA ￿ Z ￿ G ￿ Y RT since Z =
2
3
￿tx3 (total commuting costs).
This yields the basic ￿nal product nc + G equal to the net value of input, namely
nA ￿ Z ￿ Y RT: Here total commuting costs, Z and administrative costs, Y RT are
intermediate consumption goods, frictions in a sense needed to obtain ￿nal demand but
5 Consider A = aN￿L1￿￿ with N = 1 unit of labor and L = 1 unit of land.
6 Y = 1 might be thought of as private land ownership with all rent going to the outside
agent while Y = 0 de￿nes pure collective ownership of the farmland. The familiar Henry George case has Y = 0:
7 Our analysis could be carried out completely for a community on a line with the forti￿ed town in the center.
4yeilding no direct utility in themselves. These ￿frictions￿, Z and Y RT are derived from
primary inputs and are thus intermediate. In the classic Henry George case, Y = 0; and land
rent fails to appear in the accounts for the economy. Above land rent only appears as an
accounting entry in the de￿nition of costs of administration.
(b) To obtain values for c and G; we observe that maximization of utility by choice of G
(by a planner, say) yields the well-known Samuelson condition8
Uc = nUG (1)
for Uz a partial derivative with respect to z: Note that G is a ￿ow of services per period,
relative to the ￿xed durable forti￿cation, say a wall around the village. Payment for the
services is also a ￿ow, as in maintenance costs per period. Here G; protection, is a public
good since it enters ￿equally￿ in each household’s utility function. The Samuelson condition
here indicates the appropriate level of output of G relative to the level of output of the private
good, c: This ￿rst order condition, combined with ￿ = G=n; implies that ￿ = GUG
Uc ; i.e. that
￿ is the value of G to a household, given price UG
Uc de￿ned in terms of consumption good, c:
(c) To obtain a value for edge, x; we maximize the utility of a representative farmer
given Y ￿xed at some positive value between 0 and unity. We examine d




















dx = 0 to consider. This expression reduces to


















dx 2￿xdx = 0: Hence
the central result:
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= f[1 ￿ Y ]r(x) ￿ Y tx=2g: (2)
On the left is the average cost of one more farmer in the economy and on the right is the
marginal cost of one more person. This is one way of describing the Henry George Rule for
optimal population (Arnott and Stiglitz [1979]). Given a speci￿cation for U(c;G) we can
solve for x;c;G and level U as functions of Y:
Our economics proceeds as follows. The tax at rate Y on total rent must extract A dollars
as a salary for the administrator. We will see below why she is paid this amount. Hence we
8 Our center is organizing the production of the public good and collecting the
￿fees￿. We are assuming that preferences of farmers have been revealed. This is
public provision of the public good in contrast with Olszewski and Rosenthal [2006] who have private provision
of the public good. In the latter’s interesting voting model, farmers vote for their
richest compatriot to be the leader because he will create the largest public good, given his relatively large income.
5can substitute for Y with A=RT(x) everywhere above. In particular, (2) becomes










We will then have two equations, (1) and (3), in G and x to solve for an equilibrium for the
case of the "land tax" administrator.
3 Shared Administration by Farmers
Instead of hiring a "professional" administrator from "outside" at wage $A per period,
we have each citizen do a small fraction of the administration per period in rotation. We
proceed to obtain a maximin outcome under this institutional arrangement. Each farmer
gives up some farming time, per period, to act as the administrator. Each farmer rotates
through the job, once per period, at a total cost of $A to the economy per period. In this
case, each period each farmer serves as the administrator for a spell of 1=n(x) of the the
length of the interval. This is a participatory or a highly democratic approach to getting
administration done. Hence each farmer’s net output becomes (
n(x)￿1
n(x) )A: Summing
over all n(x) farmers leaves A as total lost time for administration per period.9 The new
allocation problem is to maximize per capita utility with this new de￿nition of per capita
consumption, namely c (= A ￿ r(x) ￿ tx + R
T￿A
n ￿ G
n): That is, per capita utility is now
U(A ￿ r(x) ￿ tx + R
T￿A
n ￿ G
n;G): Again we assume the planner has the solution satisfy
the Samuelson condition in (1) plus dU
dx = 0: This latter reduces to
RT(x) ￿ G = A + r(x)n(x): (4)
The equilibrium with shared administration is the pair (x;G) satisfying (1), with the new
de￿nition of consumption, c and (4).10 Formally then the type of administration reduces
to the solution for a particular equilibrium, one with A drawn from the economy by a
tax on land rent and the other with A drawn from the economy by a "take" of amount A;
which can be thought of as from land rent, also. One thinks of explicit land rent taxation
as distortionary, while the alternate form of "taxation" resembles a lump-sum taking. This
intuition "goes through" and we do indeed see that to raise $A; explicit land rent taxation has
a higher dead weight loss. (This is our central result for the ￿rst half of this paper.) Hence
the seeming evolutionary superiority of doing administration at the center by co-operative
participation of citizenry. We invoke a Cobb-Douglas utility function, U = c￿G1￿￿ with
9 In fact there is the prospective administrator "loose" in the economy and we assume that this person
￿lls in for each farmer while the latter is administering. The ￿ller-in acts in every way like the farmer he is ￿lling in
for, includingsendinglandrenttothecenter. Thisassumptionabouttheuseofthe"extra"personguaranteesthattotal
land rent in the economy is not reduced at each instant by the shift of a farmer from farming to administering.
10 Once the tax rate is substituted for, each problem is left with equation (1) the
same to be used for solving each model. Hence solving the two models involves
equations (1) and (3) in one case and equations (1) and (4) in the other.
6￿ = 0:7: We set t = 0:1; A = 3:0 and r(x) = 0:00001: The participatory administration
case solves with (c;G;x;U;RT;n) as (1.308, 504.3, 16.919, 7.80588, 507.18, 899.29) and
the "professional" administrator case with the same vector has values (1.3124, 500.3, 16.82,
7.805749, 498.33, 888.798). Our conjecture is that these results are independent of the
form of the utility function, as long as it is homogeneous of degree unity in the arguments.
Note that we are raising a very small sum to hire the administrator and hence the small
difference in utility levels. The tax rate for raising funds for the "professional" administrator
case is A=RT = 0:602%: Our tax incidence "wedge" for the two contrasting institutional
arrangements is also small (U = 7:80588 versus 7:805749) because our economy is raising
a small amount of revenue relative to its size. Striking is the relatively large difference in
community size (participatory administration larger, with a larger public good) even with the
seemingly small distortion.
We perturbed these solutions by shifting edge value r(x) and A and found no deviation
from the low dead weight loss associated with participatory administration. The case of
r(x) = 0 was a focus of our attention. It is not dif￿cult to generate an alternate solution in a
pair of solutions with a very small community size for the case of explicit land rent taxation.
Such alternate solutions exhibit low utility levels and we do not spend more time on them.
4 Comments
Our incidence result suggests to us the evolutionary ￿tness of administration by co-
operative participation at the center rather than administration by an "outside professional".
We have introduced no "transactions" costs for operating the co-operative participation
scheme. Nor have we considered the matter of the level of performance which each of the
alternate modes exhibits. Clearly hiring an outside professional circumvents the dif￿cult
task of rotating many farmers through the job each period. And a "permanent professional"
can be chosen by merit and can learn on the job and become skilled at doing the required
administration. A hired agent can specialize and build up experience useful to those
governed. To paraphrase Adam Smith, useful learning is limited by the time in the job. The
￿ip-side is of course that learning to exploit the governed is also limited by the time in the
job. Regular rotation of the governor can mitigate against the latter tendency. Hence the
attractive "middle" case in which an administrator is say elected by universal frachise for a
￿xed term with say a maximum of two terms.
We are re￿ecting on three stylized modes of having administration at the center get done.
Our co-operative, participatory mode (a kibbutz of sorts) is the most ￿democratic￿. Each
of the governed is rotated through the job at the center on a regular basis. Competence
or ￿tness for the task is sacri￿ced as well as the development of experience useful to the
governed. The payoff is presumably in avoiding entrenchment by a potentially exploitative
7administrator at the center. Our other polar case, is an administrator selected for skill by the
governed and placed in of￿ce until a lack of competence is manifested. The payoff here is in
having (a) a skilled person in the post and (b) allowing for the development of experience
useful to the governed. The downside of this mode is in having the incumbant entrench
him or herself and emerge as an autocrat. Learning to exploit the governed is to a large
extent limited by the time in the position. There is a clear trade-off here. A lengthy period of
incumbancy by the executive allows for experience and specialization to be exploited in the
interest of the governed but longer incumbancy opens the door to possible dislodgeability
and dictatorship. Our third mode is a ￿convex combination￿ of the above two polar cases.
The post of administrator is ￿lled for a ￿xed term and the incumbant is then rotated out
in an election for a replacement. The ￿xed term is introduced in an attempt to prevent the
incumbant from turning to practices to exploit the governed. Filling by a vote is designed
to bestow legitimacy on the appointee. We see a signi￿cant payoff to having a very large
fraction of the governed actually voting for the new administrator. One wants to avoid
factionalism as in having a coalition of the governed arrange to have their favorite candidate
become the new administrator. Farmers, the governed must give up some farming time to
learn about the candidates and to actually cast their ballots. Civic participation is thus costly.
It would seem appropriate to ￿ne citizens who fail to vote.11 Not being able to construct
a mechanism for rotation of the administrator leads to local autocracy and exploitation of
the governed by the center. There appears to be a plausible evolutionary ￿tness of local
exploitative landlordism as the dominant mode of government over much of history and over
many places.
A specialized administrator can entrench himself, given inside information and perhaps
links with administrators in neighboring communities, and become predatory on the whole
￿ow of land rent moving through the center. Part of entrenchment is related to threats to the
security of the community from attack from the outside. An administrator who can display
prowess in battle and in defense of the community will win the favor of the farmers and will
be dif￿cult to rotate out of his post.12 In the broad sweep of history, autocrats who came
11 The standard argument is that person i has little incentive to take time to vote because the probability of her vote
being decisive in the question of whether candidate A or candidate B wins is very small. Hence a very small payoff to
voting weighed against a demonstrable cost of turning out and casting a ballot. We are actually interested in a slightly
different phenomenon. An election for a new administrator in our set-up is a legitimization process. We assume
thatthecandidatesforadministratorwillbefacingthesameagendaandperformingverysimilarly. Candidatesdonot
have legislative agendas in our simple set-up. A poor turn-out in the election of
a new administrator means a lower quality legitimization process. Hence if person i fails to vote because the process
ispersonallycostly, sheiscuttingintothequalityoftheligitimizationprocessandthisisourconcern. Largeturn-outs
signal high quality legitimization of the person as administrator. Low quality legitimization is
connectedtothepossibilityoftheadministratorbeingunabletocarryouthisdutieseffectively, particularlyinleading
the community in say a defensive campaign against attack by a neighboring community.
12 Green [1993] explores the idea that the center ramps up its predation on the
farmers (barons and their tenants) when a threat of violence from outside is imminent. Farmers are willing to be
"exploited"insuchcircumstancesbecausetheywantprotectionfromoutsideviolence. Green’stwististhatthecenter
8to power ￿from violence￿ will have the glow of victory about them and will be dif￿cult to
rotate out of of￿ce. The soldier-administrator will generally have a palace guard and require
a standing army. Incumbancy leads generally to entrenchment and an aggrandizement of
power. This is part of entrenchment of the autocrat at the center. It also seems true that he
who can impress with his splendor aids in his entrenchment in his position. Hence the need
for display and ostentation by the chief administrator. This is of course a two edged sword.
Ostentatious display is costly and can breed ill-will in the minds of taxpayers. Louis XIV
had his sprawling palace built at Versailles to impress his peers and subjects with his ￿divine
right￿ of rule.
It is worth emphasizing that democracy raises two problems from the perspective of this
paper. First the transition from a landlord-autocracy to some form of popularly rotating
administrator (rudimentary democracy) is not natural. One might say colloquially that it
is an uphill struggle. One has to get the autocrat out of power and then has to institute a
system of rotating and monitored administration. Large co-ordination problems are posed
by this prospective transition. For example, the setting up of the United States after its war
for independence was by no means a smooth, "natural" process. Basically all participants
expected the new executive to entrench itself in some form of autocracy or oligarchy as
in the northeast crowd dominating the new government or some analogous alternative.
Secondly, once a system is in place for rotating the administrator, it is not a trivial problem
to make the system function effectively. There is the large problem of getting incumbant
administrators to leave tranquilly after there prescribed term is over. Then there is the
dif￿culty of ￿nding a replacement that is competent, has the support of a large majority of
"the governed" and is willing to leave tranquilly when his or her term is up. There is the
perennial problem of a replacement representing the interests of a faction at the expense of
those not part of the faction in question. Once in position, there remains the basic problem
of having a mechanism for effective oversight by "the governed". There is ￿rst monitoring
the actions of the administrator to see that he or she works only on the agenda that he or she
has been assigned to work on by "the governed". "The governed" must guard against the
administrator taking actions to entrench him or herself in a way that indicates that he or she
will be dif￿cult to rotate out of of￿ce when the term expires. Then there is the "monitoring"
activity required for a legitimate turnover of administrators. "The governed" must participate
in the process of selection and legitimization of the new administrator. Usually this means
taking an interest in the candidates for the new incumbancy and participating in the selection
(i.e. voting, if election is central to the process, which we think it must be). These problems
has better information about the credibility of the imminent threat and will occasionally ramp up predation purely
foritspersonalgainwhennothreatisonthehorizon. Greenshowsinastylizedmodelthatfreeinformationexchange
can make both the center and the farmers better off on average over the long run;
a parliament is characterized as the mechanism for information pooling. Hence the
emergence of a parliament in thirteenth century England when threats of invasion from France were of great concern.
9are in a sense prior to some of the standard problems with democracy. Some classic issues
are (a) safe-guarding against the majority of low-income legislators depriving asset owners
of their private property and (b) getting the representatives of "the governed" to legislate
in a way that re￿ects the preferences of "the governed". Our sketch above of problems of
democracy are as we noted in a sense prior to these classical dif￿culties.
Kiser and Barzel [1991] argue that England was able to get protodemocratic modes of
government started after 1066 because it was somewhat insulated from invasion. They note
also in their last footnote the fact "that Swiss mountain cantons had the most democratic
form of government in medieval Europe also supports the notion that isolation may facilitate
the development of democracy". They cite Blockmans [1978] to support the contention that
Swiss cantons were indeed highly democratic. We ￿nd this view to be rather fundamental.
Credible threats to a community from the outside allow the current administrator to cast
him or herself in the role of community-protector or to essentially surround him or herself
with signi￿cant military paraphenalia including a personal contingent of guards, etc. This
military apparatus can then be used against intervenors from inside the community as well
as against outside intervenors. Simply put, credible threats from the outside allow the
administrator to become his own military force and of course to become dif￿cult to dislodge
from of￿ce by members of "his" community. Such military leaders acquire experience in
action and can further justify their continued incumbancy by invoking the fact that they have
special knowledge for defending the community. The leader argues persuasively that he or
she is indispensible to the community. Once in power, they then have a variety of ways to
entrench themselves as the permanent leader. The practical implication of a credible outside
threat is that it allows the leader to fortify his personal dwelling greatly and to develop a
standing army. In the absence of the outside threat, a police force will suf￿ce to maintain
internal security.
The agenda of political discourse is very different for a community, like a valley canton
in Switzerland, free of violence from the outside. The governed can debate what the
administrator should be doing and can contemplate rotating the administrator after a period
in of￿ce. The administrator in turn could not justify militarizing his of￿ce. There is then
the large question of whether democracy can co-exist in a nation with incipient or actual
warfare on its doorstep. Churchill seems to have functioned as a wartime leader pretty well
within the democratic institutions of Britain between 1940-45. Lincoln fought an election
for President, within the US democratic framework, while the civil war was taking place in
the United States. The Isrealis have preserved their democracy while being threatened by
their neighbors and while striking out at their neighbors in small wars. These seem to be
exceptions. More typical would be the shelving of democratic practices while an outside
threat is addressed by the nation. We might generalize to say that adulterated democracy can
10co-exist with a military threat to a nation but not the purer form of "textbook democracy".13
5 Constraining Predation of the Lord-landowner
McGuire and Olson [1997] developed the idea that the lord at the center would avoid
￿taxing￿ farmers too heavily in order to maintain a pro￿tably large tax base. Very high
tax rates could shrink the economy to an extent that the lord actually reduces his potential
income. In particular, McGuire and Olson argue that the lord would provide public goods
(eg. law and order) which enhance the productivity of farmers and thus contribute to
enlarging the tax base for the lord. Over time a dynasty would be interested in having the
economy and the ￿tax base￿ grow and McGuire and Olson contended that ￿an invisible
hand￿ led to the interests of lord-administrator moving in parallel with those of the governed.
This might be labelled the Laffer Curve theory of lordship restraint. At some rate Y less
unity, the lord administrator would ￿nd his personal income a maximum, apparently at an
instant of time as well as over time as the economy was expanding. Here we take up a
"market" constraint on the landlord’s predation on her tenant farmers. We introduce an
outside option for a tenant farmer. She can move to another community if Y becomes too
high locally so that she is being immiserized by her local lord. The other community must
be "offering" a higher utility level.
Consider now the center as landowner maximizing his income, Y RT(x) per period, but
now facing the possibility of farmers migrating down the road to the next community if their
utility falls below that observable in the next community, say, U. A ￿high￿ take rate, Y may
drive local farmers away when the local equilibrium utility level is driven below that for a
neighboring community.14 This exogenous utility level, U represents the outside option for
a local farmer (not a serf legally tied to the lord’s domain). The lord faces this mobility
constraint and selects his community size, x and his take rate Y in order to maximize his
income, Y RT.15
13 One thinks of Joseph Stalin becoming Secretary of the Central Committe of
the Communist Party in 1922 in the Soviet Union and gradually consolidating all power in his of￿ce.
14 We leave open the question of how the equilibrium level of U gets set in a
system of many communities. One naturally thinks of a ￿marginal￿ community with
the lowest productivity parameter A yielding an in￿ntesimal surplus for its lord.
15 North and Thomas [1971] contend that serfs in medieval England were not tied to the manor, like
slaves. They then argue that predation on the output of his serfs by the lord of the manor would be restrained. ￿The
lord’spowertoexploithisserfs, however, wasnotunlimited; intheextreme, theserfcouldillegallystealawaytoseek
asylum on another manor or, somewhat later, in one of a growing number of medieval towns. Nor were such fugitives
likelytobereturnedbythelord’sneighboringrival. TheabundanceoflandduringthehighMiddleAgesmadelabora
very scarce and therefore valuable factor of production. Since the provision of public
goods (in this case, protection and justice) is subject over some range to decreasing
costs, some medieval lords were always in active competition with their peers to enlarge their estates.￿ (p. 788)
11For a given value of Y; the two equations
U(c;G) = U (5)
and Uc ￿ nUG = 0 (6)
de￿ne equilibrium values x and G; assuming U is a binding value. From these two equations
we can solve for dx
dY and dG
dY : We need dx
dY in the calculation of the rent maximizing tax rate
Y for the landlord, given the outside option constraint, U: The landlord maximizes Y RT(x)
by choice of Y subject to (5) and (6). This leaves us with three equations (the ￿rst order


















6 + (1 ￿ ￿)[a ￿ (r(x) + tx) + (1 ￿ Y )(r(x) + tx
3 )]
:
We are able to "eliminate" G and solve for x and Y with equations (5) , (6) and (7) de￿ning
the landlord’s rent maximizing community, given each farmer’s outside option in U: For
￿ = 0:7; t = 0:1; U = 7:0; A = 3; and r(x) = 0:00001; we obtain a community with
x = 14:0346; slightly smaller than our earlier optimal community with U ￿ 7:8: And
striking is the relatively high value of Y = 0:4054 for the "tax" rate on land rent.
In a world of very abundant labor, a free farmer would be doing poorly whether she
stayed put or she re-located to a neighboring community. The irony here is that serfdom
and slavery only make sense in a world of scarce labor (U at a resonable positive value). In
world of abundant labor U is very low and farmers have no attractive alternatives to staying
put and working for a small reward. With U at a reasonable value, a landlord must set a low
take rate if she wants a large domain or she must somehow chain tenants or serfs or laborers
to her domain by force. In recent history, large-scale slavery is associated with areas of
signi￿cant labor scarcity, eg. the nineteenth century south in the US and the eighteenth and
nineteenth century West Indies. The Black Death of 1347-48 created a labor shortage and we
might say a high U: Peasant-landlord relations seemingly changed for good.16 Labor faced
good prospects for some decades but as the population rose back to trend and farmers faced
lower wages and presumably poorer outside options ( reasonable U
0
s). Nevertheless, in
England, a return to serf-like conditions did not occur. The small capitalist farmer (yeoman)
emerged in many places because his rights were defended in the courts. Elsewhere, powerful
landlords enclosed open lands and drove many small farmers away while converting their
large holdings to pasturage rather than crop-raising (Allen [1992; pp. 64-77).17 It would not
16 Why did landlords turn to some form of slavery in order to obtain low cost
labor? This is clearly a large and interesting question to ponder.
17 There are echoes of McGuire-Olson here. Roughly speaking, by subsidizing in-
migration, each local farmer is willing to shoulder marginally more of the cost of the public good. Hence one might
12be surprising to hear that labor mobility represented a historial break, sudden labor scarcity
opened up the possibility of a market for free labor, and the beginning of a democratic
organization of life but here we have ￿lled in some detail of this argument. Allen’s principal
point is that though labor abundance threatened the improved status of the yeoman farmer in
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the impoved status was defended by an enlightened
system of customs and laws. Why the courts moved in to defend the property rights of
small, nascent-capitalistic farmers in such a signi￿cant way is unclear. Across the Atlantic
Ocean, the American Revolution could well have settled into some form of government by
aristocracy but labor scarcity meant an elevated status for workers and as matters evolved,
resulted in a fairly democratic form of government, a beacon to the rest of the world.
Two other theories of ￿tax restraint￿ by the center involve the theat of being deposed, one
scenario involving local farmers and another involving a neighboring lord. The ￿rst case has
been investigated by Usher [1989] in an interesting model of weakening at the center, the
spreading of chaos at the periphery (widespread banditry), and the overthrow of the current
autocracy. The exploitative lord-administrator is always exposed to potential overthrow by
an organized group of farmers who convince the masses that the new group of outsiders
can do the administatration at less cost than is being done by the current lord-administrator.
This seems to capture the essence of the French Revolution and perhaps even the American
Revolution.18 An articulate group of revolutionaries convinces ￿the governed￿ that they
will be better off with the articulate ￿outside￿ group in power. The Russian Revolution
of 1917 was certainly based on the revolutionaries promising an improvement in living
standards for the governed, but the program of reform was or certainly turned out to be
more extensive than simply doing public administration more ef￿ciently. The second case
has been investigated in an interesting variant of the Usher model by Konrad and Skaperdas
[2004]. Konrad and Skaperdas formulate and equilibrium with local lords threatening each
other. The equilibrium they develop involves each lord maintaining large defenses against
saythatourlord, byvoluntarilylimitinghistake, isindirectlyofferingmorepublicgoodtohisfarmersbysubsidizing
entry to the community and in so doing is ￿optimizing￿ his ￿tax base￿ by making each farmer ￿more productive￿.
18 The emergence of democracy is a complicated matter, it seems. However, one can make the case for the British
aristocracycedingpowertolowerclassesviatheReformActof1832, notoutoffearofrevolution, butoutofhopefor
the economy to evolve in a way that improved their relative position. For example, the aristocracy
might have envisaged transferring some of the burden of constructing new infrastructure and maintaining the military
to the newly enfrachised classes; that is, more taxation with representation. This point in made by Engineer
[1997]inanabstractframework. Fromthisperspective, theReformscouldbeviewedasreducingfuturetaxliabilities
on the artistocracy. Acemoglu and Robinson [2000] argue that franchise extension represented a device
toassurerestlesslowerclassesthatreforms, grantedbytheupperclasses, couldnotbeeasilyrenegeduponinthenear
future. Franchise extension represented a commitment device by the upper classes to reforms, reforms favoring
the lower classes. In our suggestion, the upper classes would have needed a commitment from the newly enfanchised
folk that they would not in fact raise taxes on the upper classes in the future. No such device emerged and it appears
that indeed the upper classes faced much higher taxes, in later decades. Franchise extension became the lesser of two
evils: revolution or gradual ￿con￿scation￿ by ￿the people￿ over future decades. Jack and Lagunoff [2006] develop an
in￿nite horizon, median voter model in which incremental extension of the franchise, period by period, is an
equilibrium outcome. Democracy as a form of government poses two problems to the analyst: how does it get started
and how does it remain as the dominant governing mode over the long haul, given persistent threats to its viability.
13neighbors and a general impoverishment of the communities in general.
The Usher model builds on a primitive state in which farmers and bandits co-exist
with the same utility level. Bandits derive ￿income￿ by stealing a fraction of the output
of the farmers. A farmer in turn must use up some of her current product in defensive
expenditure. From this primitive equilibrium, one moves on to consider the introduction
of ￿a center￿ which organizes community defense via economies of scale (by introducing
defense as a public good). Our formulation leads to an interesting issue in model extension.
Our farmers, in contrast to those in the Usher model, consume both private and public
goods explicitly. Bandits would presumably prey on crops perhaps or somehow on the
private consumption ￿ow of a farmer in our set-up but would hardly prey on the public
good (defensive forti￿cations). This raises the question about productive activity being
channelled in a way so as to minimize theft by bandits. In earlier centuries, production could
well have been directed to immobile outputs such as walls, moats, castles, and maybe very
heavy artillery pieces. Light durable equipment such as looms, spinning wheels, foundary
equipment, pottery-making equipment, tools, etc. would have been invested in sparingly
in order to discourage roving bandits from bearing down and stealing. In modern times,
banditry is endemic in the slums of large cities in the third world and many otherwise very
productive people end up staying home in order to guard against theft. One thinks of things
such as bicycles, pots and pans, tools, etc. being stolen. One does not need large-scale
banditry then to have economic progress impeded. Small-scale banditry can skew economic
progress in signi￿cant ways.19
6 Concluding Remarks
Our ￿rst and principal result is the low incidence cost of raising $A by participatory
co-operation in administration relative to a land rent tax, for funding a "professional"
administrator. We then re￿ected on why the democratic form of administration of a
community did not emerge as a general mode over the sweep of history. Our thinking here
was that the "professional" mode of administration has been dominant and has generally
involved "con￿scatory" rates of remuneration at "the center". We then reported on a standard
mechanism constraining a predatory administrator from taxing her "subjects" too highly,
namely the possibility of a citizen migrating away when the "tax-rate" became too high.
Our analysis has been conducted in a variant of the textbook "optimal" spatial economy, a
variant of the Henry George economy. This framework, we suggest, has made our analysis
19 The New York Times (October 17, 2006, p. C1) reports on a study of the impact of crime on national output in
Latin America. Researchers suggest that had Brazil’s homicide rate been as low as
CostaRica’sintheearly1990’s, GDPinBrazilwouldhave3to8percenthigher. Rampantcrimediscouragesforeign
investment. In addition the costs of guarding people and property is a form of waste
since the guards could be doing more productive things if the society were less plagued by crime.
14quite complete and straightforward. The Olson-McGuire framework strikes us as de￿cient
in detail. The downside of our approach is that the optimal spatial economy framework
is not easy to interpret as a real-world phenomenon, as with other optimal frameworks in
economic analysis. Hence though our analysis seems straightforward, we may not have
been working in the best framework for getting a grasp on real-world history. For example,
our assumption that Samuelson’s public goods allocation rule is holding always is not very
realistic. Thus our speculations on historical events through the lens of our model must
regretably be discounted at a non-zero rate.
15Appendix 1: Henry George Theory with Variable Farm Size
It is easy to come away with the impression that the Henry George property of our basic
model above depends on a careful ￿xing of margins; i.e. ￿xed farm size and ￿xed production
per farm. We can however extend the model and see things largely unchanged with farm
sizes varying with land rents. Let h(x) be farm size at radial distance x; with land rent R(x)
per unit of land. Let farm output be ￿h(x)￿; ￿ and ￿ positive with ￿ less than unity (output




Now residual consumption c is de￿ned, as above, in







For each farmer to achieve the same utility, we require that the R(x) and h(x) functions
satisfy dc




n as parameters in her re-location consideration. Hence, location indifference is
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20 We could have the one farmer per farm exerting a ￿xed amount of effort in
farming but this would formally be an extra constant in the production function.
21 The special case of ￿ = 0:5 is less cluttered and will be useful below.For ￿ =
0:5; we have
dR(x)
dx + kR(x)2 = 0 for k = t




R(x) + k[x ￿ x]
:
16This property of the model is the important link in establishing the Henry George Theorem
for this model. Our preliminaries are complete.
We turn to equilibrium for each farmer-household. The representative farmer’s utility is
U(￿h(x)￿ ￿ h(x)R(x) ￿ tx + R
T
n ￿ G
n;G) and maximization with respect to G yields the
familiar Samuelson condition
Uc = nUG:
We assume that this condition is then satis￿ed for each farmer and consider the matter
of an optimal size x￿ for the town with varying farm size. That is, we examine
dU(c(x);G(x))
dx = 0 or d





n(x);G(x)) = 0 for
h(x) and R(x) de￿ned above and RT(x) =
R x





invoke the ef￿ciency condition and the Samuelson condition and this reduces our problem


















































Above, we established the crucial property: h(x)
dR(x)
dx = ￿t independent of the value of x:
Hence we are allowed to move h(x)
dR(x)
dx under the ￿rst integral sign and we obtain directly















dn(x￿) is then per capita differential land rent. We have then established
the Henry George result for an economy with varying farm size and an associated non-linear
land rent function. The interpretation of this ￿optimal size￿ condition is: the marginal cost of
an entrant, namely R(x)2￿x￿ dx
￿












n(x￿) ￿ R(x)2￿x￿ dx
￿




the margin, x￿ the marginal entrant is indifferent between entering and staying out.
This analysis immediately above establishes that the Henry George Theorem holds
for quite general ￿monocentric cities￿, not just those with ￿xed lot sizes and linear rent
Since h(x) = ￿t
dR(x)=dx = ￿t







+ k[x ￿ x]]2:
17functions.22
6.1 ￿Failure￿ of the Henry George Result
What about our restriction to linear commuting costs? We can relax this linear form and see
the consequences. Thus a quadratic commuting cost, 1
2tx2 and ￿ = 0:5 in the production




R(x) + k[x2 ￿ x2]
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dx = ￿tx; this latter NOT a constant. This means we
cannot move h(x)
dR(x)




h(x)dx to obtain the pure Henry














Henry George theory has the term in square brackets equal to zero. This term fails to
equal zero for this case of non-linear commuting costs. Hence we observe that linearity in
commuting costs are crucial for obtaining the standard Henry George Result for our class of
land use models. We still have a Henry George result satisfying: average cost of entry of the
marginal farmer equals the marginal cost, but the latter has become a quite messy expression.
Our suspicion is that this linearity is necessary for a quite wide class of models.23
22 Thismodelturnsouttosolveconsistentlywiththelevelofoutputofthepublicgoodnearzero. Inourviewitwas
suf￿ciently ill-behaved numerically that we did not use it as the basis for additional analyses.
23 Arnott and Stiglitz [1979] abstract from the details of commuting costs in their
analysis and represent the location of a household by a simple distance variable.
Hence rent-distance functions do not play a central role in their analysis. They also frame their analysis in terms of an
explicit optimal population argument, detouring around our concern with an economy
with an optimal size or edge x: It is thus somewhat dif￿ult to compare their arguments with ours.
18References:
[1] Acemoglu, D. and J. Robinson [2000] ￿Why Did the West Extend the Franchise?
Democracy, Inequality and Growth in Historical Perspective￿, Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 115, pp. 1167-1199.
[2] Allen, Robert C. [1992] Enclosure and the Yeoman, Oxford: Clarendon.
[3] Arnott, Richard and Joseph E. Stiglitz [1979] ￿Aggregate Land Rents, Expenditure
on Public Goods and Optimal City Size￿, Quarterly Journal of Economics, XCII, pp.
471-500.
[4] Black, Duncan and Vernon Henderson [1999] ￿A Theory of Urban Growth￿ Journal of
Political Economy, 107, 2, pp. 252-84.
[5] Blockmans, Wim [1978] "A Typology of Representative Institutions in Late Medieval
Europe", Journal of Medieval History, 4, pp. 189-215.
[6] Engineer, Merwan [1997] ￿Neo-Hobbesian Public Finance￿ manuscript.
[7] Flatters, Frank, Vernon Henderson, and Peter Mieszkowski [1974] ￿Public Goods,
Ef￿ciency and Regional Fiscal Equalization￿ Journal of Public Economics, 3, pp.
99-112.
[8] Green, Edward J. [1993] "On the Emergence of Parliamentary Government: The Role
of Private Information" Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review, 17, 1,
Winter.
[9] Hartwick, John M. [1980] ￿The Henry George Rule, Optimal Population, and
Interregional Equity￿ Canadian Journal of Economics, 8, 4, November, pp. 695-699.
[10] Helsley, Robert W and William C. Strange [1990] "Matching and Agglomeration
Economies in a System of Cities", Regional Science and Urban Economics, vol. 20,
no. 2, September 1990, pp. 189-212.
[11] Jack, William and Roger Lagunoff [2006] ￿Dynamic Enfranchisement￿, Journal of
Public Economics, 90, 4-5, pp. 551-72.
[12] Kiser, Edgar and Yoram Barzel [1991] "The Origins of Democracy in England",
Rationality and Society, 3, 4, October, pp. 396-422.
[13] Konrad, Kai A. and Sterglos Skaperdas [2004] ￿What Kind of Order out of Anarchy?
Self-governance, Autocracy and Predatory Competition￿, manuscript, February, 2004.
[14] McGuire, Martin and Mancur Olson [1996] ￿The Economics of Autocracy and
Majority Rule: The Invisible Hand and the Use of Force￿, Journal of Economic
Literature, 34, pp. 72-96.
[15] North, Douglass C. and Robert Paul Thomas [1971] ￿The Rise and Fall of the Manorial
System: A Theoretical Model￿, Journal of Economic History, 31, 4, December, pp.
777-803.
[16] Olszewski, Wojciech and Howard Rosenthal [2006] ￿Politically Determined Income
Inequality and the Provision of Public Goods￿ Journal of Public Economic Theory,
forthcoming.
[17] Usher, Dan [1989] ￿The Dynastic Cycle and the Stationary State￿, American Economic
Review, 79, 5, pp. 1031-1044.
19[18] Usher, Dan [2003] Political Economy, Oxford: Blackwell.
20